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Abstract
This paper develops an open economy model with heterogeneous final goods producers who
simultaneously choose whether to export their goods and whether to use imported intermedi-
ates. The model highlights mechanisms whereby import policies affect aggregate productivity,
resource allocation, and industry export activity along both the extensive and intensive mar-
gins. Using the theoretical model, we develop and estimate a structural empirical model that
incorporates heterogeneity in productivity and shipping costs using Chilean plant-level manu-
facturing data. The estimated model is consistent with the key features of the data regarding
productivity, exporting, and importing. We perform a variety of counterfactual experiments
to assess quantitatively the positive and normative effects of barriers to trade in import and
export markets. These experiments suggest that there are substantial aggregate productivity
and welfare gains due to trade. Furthermore, because of import and export complementarities,
policies which inhibit the importation of foreign intermediates can have a large adverse effect
on the exportation of final goods.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a stochastic industry model of heterogeneous firms to examine the effects of
trade liberalization on resource reallocation, industry productivity, and welfare in the presence
of import and export complementarities. We use the theoretical model to develop empirical
models which we estimate using Chilean plant-level manufacturing data. The estimated models
are then used to perform counterfactual experiments regarding different trading regimes to assess
the positive and normative effects of barriers to trade in import and export markets.
Previous empirical work suggests that there is a substantial degree of resource reallocation
across firms within an industry following trade liberalization and these shifts in resources con-
tribute to productivity growth. Pavcnik (2002) uses Chilean data and finds such reallocations
and productivity effects after trade liberalization in that country. Trefler (2004) estimates these
effects in Canadian manufacturing following the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement using plant-
and industry-level data and finds significant increases in productivity among both importers and
exporters.
Empirical evidence also suggests that relatively more productive firms are more likely to
export.1 In this paper we provide empirical evidence that whether or not a firm is importing
intermediates for use in production may also be important for explaining differences in plant
performance.2 Our data suggests that firms which are both importing and exporting tend to be
larger and more productive than firms that are active in either market, but not both. Hence, the
impact of trade on resource reallocation across firms which are importing may be as important
as shifts across exporting firms.
Melitz (2003) develops a monopolistic competition model of exporters with different produc-
tivities which is motivated by the empirical findings regarding exporters described above.3 To
1See, for example, Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000), Bernard and Jensen (1999), Bernard, et al. (2003),
Clerides, Lack and Tybout (1998), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004a). Other observations on firm level
exports include: (a) a majority of firms do not export, (b) most exporters only export a small fraction of their
output, and (c) most exporters only export to a small number of countries.
2See also Kasahara and Rodrigue (2005). Few empirical studies simultaneously examine both exports and
imports at the micro-level. A notable exception is Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005) who provide empirical
evidence regarding both importers and exporters in the U.S.
3Several alternative trade theories with heterogeneous firms have been developed in response to these observa-
tions on exporters. Eaton and Kortum (2002) develop a Ricardian model of trade with firm-level heterogeneity.
Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004b) explore a model that nests both the Richardian framework of Eaton and
Kortum and the monopolistic competition approach of Melitz. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) present a
monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms that focuses on the firm’s choice between exports and
foreign direct investment.
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address simultaneously the empirical regularities concerning importers, we begin by extending
his model to incorporate imported intermediate goods. In the model, the use of foreign interme-
diates increases a firm’s productivity but, due to fixed costs of importing, only inherently highly
productive firms import intermediates.
In this environment, trade liberalization which lowers restrictions on the importation of
intermediates increases aggregate productivity because some inherently productive firms start
importing and achieve within-plant productivity gains. This, in turn, leads to a resource reallo-
cation from less productive to more productive importing firms, enhancing the positive aggregate
productivity effect. Furthermore, productivity gains from importing intermediates may allow
some importers to start exporting, leading to a resource reallocation along the intensive margin.
In equilibrium, higher labor demand from new importers and exporters increases the real wage
and, as a result, the least productive firms exit from the market. Thus, the model identifies an
important mechanism whereby import tariff policy affects aggregate exports and this interaction
is essential for understanding the impact of trade policy on aggregate productivity and welfare.4
Using the theoretical model, we develop and estimate a structural empirical model of ex-
ports and imports using a panel of Chilean manufacturing plants. Importantly, we consider an
extended model that incorporates firm-level heterogeneity in international shipping costs which
allow us to analyze the differences in the export and import intensities across firms. The esti-
mated model with heterogeneous productivity and shipping costs captures the observed patterns
of productivity across firms with different import and export status as well as the observed dis-
tribution of the export and import intensities. It is also consistent with the high degree of trade
concentration among a small number of plants in our data, replicating the observation that the
top one percent of exporters account for forty percent of total exports.
We find that the estimated mean of the productivity distribution at the steady state is
thirty-nine percent higher than the estimated mean at entry, suggesting that selection through
endogenous exit plays an important role in determining aggregate productivity. Furthermore,
the estimated model indicates that firms with high productivity and low shipping costs tend to
self-select into exporting and importing. Hence, heterogeneity in both productivity and shipping
4It should be noted that in standard trade theory, restrictions on imports of final goods will lower exports
of final goods so as to maintain balanced trade. In this paper, we are studying a different mechanism whereby
import restrictions on intermediates decreases exports of final goods through their effect on productivity and the
fixed costs of trade in the presence of heterogeneous firms.
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costs plays an important role in determining export and import status.
To examine the effects of trade policies, we perform a variety of counterfactual experiments
that explicitly take into account equilibrium price adjustments. The experiments suggest that
the welfare gains in moving from autarky to trade are substantial, with increases in real aggregate
income ranging from 1.5-2.3 percent. In addition, we find that the equilibrium price response
plays an important role in redistributing resources across heterogeneous firms; experiments based
on a partial equilibrium model that ignores the equilibrium price response provide substantially
different estimates of the impact of trade on aggregate productivity. Another important finding
is that because of import and export complementarities, policies which inhibit the importation
of foreign intermediates can have a large adverse effect on the exportation of final goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on
the distribution of importers and exporters and their performance using Chilean manufacturing
plant-level data. Section 3 presents a theoretical model with import and export complemen-
tarities. Section 4 provides details and results of the structural estimation of empirical models.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Motivation
In this section we briefly describe Chilean plant-level data and provide summary statistics to
characterize patterns and trends of plants which may or may not participate in international
markets. Section 4.6 describes the data set in detail.
2.1 Importers and Exporters Distribution and Performance
Table 1 provides several important basic facts about exporters and importers. The fraction
of plants that are engaged in trade is relatively small but has increased over time as shown
in the first three rows of Table 1. Furthermore, as shown in the fourth through seventh rows
of that table, plants that both export and import account for a larger fraction of exports and
imports than their counterparts which only export or only import. In addition, the percentage
of total output accounted for by firms which were engaged in international trade increased from
73.3% in 1990 to 79.7% in 1996. Plants that both exported and imported became increasingly
important in accounting for total output: they constitute only 12.6% of the sample but account
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Table 1: Exporters and Importers in Chile for 1990-1996 (% of Total)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1990-96 ave.
Exporters 8.4 9.7 9.2 9.2 8.6 9.7 8.8 9.1
Importers 12.6 12.1 13.1 12.9 13.5 11.8 12.0 12.6
Ex/Importers 8.2 9.5 10.7 11.8 13.4 12.5 12.6 11.3
Exports by Exporters 48.4 37.8 49.3 44.9 32.6 38.1 40.5 41.6
Exports by Ex/Importers 51.6 62.2 50.7 55.1 67.4 61.9 59.5 58.4
Imports by Importers 34.8 32.1 31.5 27.8 22.0 20.8 26.7 28.0
Imports by Ex/Importers 65.2 67.9 68.5 72.2 78.0 79.2 73.3 72.0
Output by Exporters 17.4 16.7 23.4 18.9 15.2 20.1 17.8 18.5
Output by Importers 16.8 12.9 14.9 15.0 14.1 13.3 14.4 14.5
Output by Ex/Importers 39.1 44.1 40.5 43.8 50.2 46.3 47.5 44.5
No. of Plants 4584 4764 4937 5041 5081 5110 5464 4997
Notes: Exporters refers to plants that export but do not import. Importers refers to plants that import but do not export.
Ex/Importers refers to plants that both export and import.
Table 2: Export and Import Concentration, 1990-1996 average
Exports Imports
% of Total Exports % of Ex/Importers % of Total Imports % of Ex/Importers
Top 1% 39.8 54.2 25.8 79.6
Top 5% 67.3 66.2 51.3 77.7
Top 10% 80.1 63.2 65.8 72.7
Notes: “Ex/Importers” refers to plants that both export and import while “% of Ex/Importers” refers to the fraction of
Ex/Importers in the top 1, 5, and 10% of exporting or importing plants.
for 47.5% of total output in 1996. Overall, this table indicates that plants that engage in both
exporting and importing are increasingly common and are important contributors to output and
the volume of trade.
Exports and imports are highly concentrated among a small number of plants.5 Table 2
reports the shares of total exports and imports in the top 1, 5, and 10 percentiles of exporting
and importing plants. As indicated in the first two columns, export concentration is very high,
with the top 1 percent of exporting plants accounting for 39.8% of total exports; furthermore,
a majority of the top 1% exporters are plants that engage in both exporting and importing.
Importers show a similar pattern although the degree of concentration is slightly smaller than
exporters while plants that both export and import play a more important role for concentration
of imports.
We also examine the degree of exporting and importing for plants by reporting the joint
5Bernard et al. (2005) find U.S. exports and imports to be concentrated among a very small number of firms.
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Table 3: Joint Distribution of Export and Import Intensities
Import Intensity
Export Intensity .00 .00-.20 .20-.40 .40-.60 .60-.80 .80-1.00
.00 .000 .175 .096 .053 .037 .020
.00-.20 .132 .100 .068 .049 .029 .008
.20-.40 .033 .015 .007 .002 .003 .002
.40-.60 .030 .016 .001 .002 .002 .001
.60-.80 .041 .018 .002 .001 .001 .001
.80-1.00 .039 .014 .001 .001 .000 .000
Notes: Export and import intensities are reported only for plants which export or import or do both. There are 11,377
observations of such plants over our time series.
distribution of export and import intensities in Table 3. A plant’s export intensity is defined as
the ratio of its export sales to total sales while its import intensity is the ratio of expenditures on
imported intermediate inputs to total expenditures on intermediate inputs. The table reports
the fraction of observations in our sample of exporting or importing plants in each intensity
bin. As the table suggests there is a sizable degree of heterogeneity across plants with regard to
export and import intensities. The average export intensity is 25% with a standard deviation
of .30 while the average import intensity is 29% with a standard deviation of .25.
We now turn to measures of plant performance and their relationships with export and import
status. While the differences in a variety of plant attributes between exporters and non-exporters
are well-known (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999), few previous empirical studies have discussed
how plant performance measures depend on import status. Table 4 presents estimated premia
in various performance measures according to export and import status. Following Bernard
and Jensen (1999), columns 1-3 of this table report export and import premia estimated from a
pooled ordinary least squares regression using the data from 1990-1996:
lnXit = α0 + α1dxit(1− dmit ) + α2dmit (1− dxit) + α3dxitdmit + Zitβ + ²it, (1)
where Xit is a vector of plant attributes (employment, sales, labor productivity, wage, non-
production worker ratio, and capital per worker). Here, dxit is a dummy for year t’s export
status, dmit is a dummy for year t’s import status, Z includes industry dummies at the four-digit
ISIC level, year dummies, and total employment to control for size. The export premium α1
is the average percentage difference between exporters and non-exporters among plants that do
not import foreign intermediates. The import premium α2 is the average percentage difference
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Table 4: Premia of Exporter and Importer
Pooled OLS: 1990-1996 Fixed Effects: 1990-1996
Export/Import Status Exporters Importers Ex/Importers Exporters Importers Ex/Importers
Total Employment 0.889 0.660 1.495 0.101 0.043 0.138
(0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
Total Sales 0.325 0.546 0.756 0.110 0.074 0.158
(0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Value Added per Worker 0.327 0.490 0.688 0.100 0.053 0.125
(0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020)
Average Wage 0.210 0.323 0.423 0.055 0.043 0.062
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Non-Production/Total Workers 0.033 0.210 0.345 0.038 0.031 0.056
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
Capital per Worker 0.495 0.512 0.866 0.066 0.016 0.134
(0.026) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
No. of Observations 34981 33853
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Total Employment” reports the estimates for exporter/importer premia from a
regression excluding the logarithm of total employment from the set of regressors. Because they are observed only for one
period, 1128 plant observations are dropped from the fixed effects regression.
between importers and non-importers among plants that do not export. Finally, α3 captures
the percentage difference between plants that neither export nor import and plants that both
export and import.
The results show that there are substantial differences not only between exporters and
non-exporters but also between importers and non-importers. The export premia among non-
importers are positive and significant for all characteristics as shown in column 1. The import
premia among non-exporters are positive and significant for all characteristics in column 2, sug-
gesting the importance of import status in explaining plant performance even after controlling
for export status. Comparing columns 1-2 with column 3, plants that are both exporting and
importing tend to be larger and be more productive than plants that are engaged in either
export or import but not both.6
We also estimate (1) using a fixed effects regression to control for plant specific effects.
The results are reported in columns 4-6. They show similar patterns to those based on the
pooled OLS in columns 1-3. Notably, all the point estimates for column 6 are larger than those
reported in columns 4-5, suggesting that plants that are both exporting and importing are larger
and more productive than other plants. The point estimates suggest that the magnitude of the
performance gap for various characteristics across different export/import status are substantial.
6Since export status is positively correlated with import status, the magnitude of the export premia estimated
without controlling for import status is likely to be overestimated by capturing the import premia.
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3 A Model of Exports and Imports
In this section, motivated by the empirical evidence presented above, we extend the trading
environment studied by Melitz (2003) to include importing of intermediates by heterogeneous
final goods producers.
3.1 Environment
The world is comprised of N + 1 identical countries. Within each country there is a set of final
goods producers and a set of intermediate goods producers.
3.1.1 Consumers
In each country there is a representative consumer who supplies labour inelastically at level
L. The consumer’s preferences over consumption of a continuum of final goods are given by
U =
[∫
ω∈Ω q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1 , where ω is an index over varieties, and σ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between varieties. Letting p(ω) denote the price of variety ω, we can derive
optimal consumption of variety ω to be q(ω) = Q
[
p(ω)
P
]−σ
, where P is a price index given
by P =
[∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−σdω
]1/(1−σ) and Q is a consumption index with Q = U . Expenditure on
variety ω is given by
r(ω) = R
[
p(ω)
P
]1−σ
, (2)
where R = PQ =
∫
ω∈Ω r(ω)dω is aggregate expenditure.
3.1.2 Production
We first describe the final-good sector which is characterized by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive firms selling horizontally differentiated goods. Final goods firms sell to domestic
consumers and in the trading environment choose whether or not to also export their goods to
foreign consumers. In production, final goods producers employ labor, domestically produced
intermediates, and choose whether or not to also use imported intermediates.
There is an unbounded measure of ex ante identical potential entrants. Upon entering, an
entrant pays a fixed entry cost, fe. Each new entrant then draws a firm-specific productivity
parameter, ϕ, from a continuous cumulative distribution G(ϕ). A firm’s productivity remains
at this level throughout its operation. After observing ϕ, a firm decides whether to immediately
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exit or stay in the market. All final goods producers must pay a fixed production cost, f ,
each period to continue in operation. In addition, in each period, a firm is forced to exit with
probability ξ.
In the open economy, firms must also pay fixed costs associated with importing intermediates
and exporting their product in any period that they choose to be active in those markets. Before
making their import and export decisions, firms draw a firm-specific shock to the fixed cost of
importing. This shock is denoted ² and is identically and independently distributed across firms
and across time with a continuous cumulative distribution H(²) defined over [², ²¯] with zero
mean. The total fixed cost per import market for a firm which is importing but not exporting
equals fm + ² > 0. A firm that is exporting but not importing incurs a non-stochastic cost of
fx > 0 each period for each export market. Finally, a firm that is both exporting and importing
incurs a fixed cost equal to ζ(fx + fm + ²) for each market, where 0 < ζ ≤ 1 determines the
degree of complementarity in fixed costs between exporting and importing.7
We let dx ∈ {0, 1} denote a firm’s export decision where dx = 0 implies that a firm does
not export their good and let dm ∈ {0, 1} denote a firm’s import decision where dm = 0 implies
that a firm does not use imported intermediates. Finally, let d = (dx, dm) denote a final good
producer’s export/import status. With this notation, we can write the total per-period fixed
cost of a firm that chooses d and draws ² as
F (d, ²) = f +Nζd
xdm [dxfx + dm(fm + ²)]
The technology for a firm with inherent productivity level ϕ and import status dm is given
by:
q(ϕ, dm) = ϕlα
[∫ 1
0
xo(j)
γ−1
γ dj + dm
∫ N
0
x(j)
γ−1
γ dj
] (1−α)γ
γ−1
,
where l is labor input, xo(j) is input of domestically-produced intermediate variety j, x(j) is
input of imported intermediate variety j, 0 < α < 1 is the labor share, and γ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between any two intermediate inputs. The measure of intermediates produced
within any country is fixed at one. We allow for iceberg importing costs so τm > 1 units of an
7We impose lower bounds on the values for fx and fm + ²¯ and upper bounds on fm + ² which guarantee that
there is a positive measure of firms in each export/import category in the open economy equilibrium. These
restrictions are similar to the condition imposed by Melitz (2003) which ensures that his economy is characterized
by partitioning of firms by export status. These derivations as well as full derivations of the theoretical results
discussed below are presented in a supplementary appendix which is available upon request.
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intermediate good must be shipped abroad for 1 unit to arrive.
In the intermediate goods industry, there is a continuum of firms, each producing a different
variety. Anyone can access the blueprints of the intermediate production technology for all
varieties and there is free entry. Firms have identical linear technologies in labor input with
marginal product equal to one. These conditions imply that domestic intermediates sold in the
domestic market will all have price equal to the wage which we normalize to one.
In the symmetric equilibrium, inputs of all domestic intermediates will be equal so xo(j) = xo
for all j. The cost minimization problem of a final goods producer implies that employment
of any imported variety will equal x(j) = x = τ−γm xo for all j. Thus expenditure on imported
intermediates and total intermediates respectively are given by
Xm = Nτ1−γm xo X = (1 +Nτ
1−γ
m )xo (3)
Finally, production can be written as
q(ϕ, dm) = a(ϕ, dm)lα[xo + dmNτmx]1−α, (4)
where
a(ϕ, dm) ≡ ϕλdm , (5)
with λ ≡ (1 +Nτ1−γm )
1−α
γ−1 > 1. We will refer to this term as a firm’s total factor productivity.8
Note that a(ϕ, 1) > a(ϕ, 0) so a firm which imports intermediates will have higher total factor
productivity than if it does not import. This increase in productivity results from increasing
returns to variety in the production function. This approach allows us to incorporate an import
premium and is motivated by the empirical findings presented in Section 2 and in Kasahara and
Rodrigue (2005).9
The form of preferences implies that final goods producers will price at a constant markup
equal to σσ−1 over marginal cost. Hence, using the final goods technology and recalling that all
intermediates are priced at the wage which equals one, we have the following pricing rule for
8Note that l is a firm’s labour input and xo+d
mNτmx is a firm’s gross input of intermediate inputs so a(ϕ, d
m)
is a residual measure of productivity.
9An alternative approach would include incorporating vertically differentiated inputs with foreign inputs of
higher quality to generate an import premium. The approach taken here has the advantage of tractability and is
widely used in models of trade with differentiated products (see, for example, Ethier, 1982).
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final goods sold in the home market for a producer with productivity ϕ and import status dm:
ph(ϕ, dm) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)(
1
Γa(ϕ, dm)
)
,
where Γ ≡ αα(1− α)1−α. As in Melitz (2003), we also assume that there are iceberg exporting
costs for final goods so that τx > 1 units of goods has to be shipped abroad for 1 unit to arrive
at its destination. The pricing rule for final goods sold in the foreign market is then given by
pf (ϕ, dm) = τxph(ϕ, dm).
The total revenue of a final good producer depends on inherent productivity and export/import
status. From (2), revenue from domestic sales can be written as rh(ϕ, dm) = R
(
σ−1
σ PΓa(ϕ, d
m)
)σ−1
while revenue from foreign sales per country of export is given by
rf (ϕ, d) = dxτ1−σx r
h(ϕ, dm). (6)
Hence, total revenue for a firm with productivity ϕ and export/import status d is given by
r(ϕ, d) = rh(ϕ, dm) +Nrf (ϕ, d) or
r(ϕ, d) = (1 + dxNτ1−σx )r
h(ϕ, dm). (7)
Thus, using equations (5) and (7), we can determine revenue for a firm with productivity
ϕ and export/import status d relative to a firm with the same productivity who is neither
exporting nor importing:
r(ϕ, d) = bd
x
x b
dm
m r(ϕ, 0, 0), (8)
where bx ≡ 1 +Nτ1−σx and bm ≡ λσ−1. Turning to profits, we see that the pricing rule of firms
implies that profits of a final good producer with inherent productivity ϕ, export/import status
d, and fixed import cost shock ² can be written as
pi(ϕ, d, ²) =
r(ϕ, d)
σ
− F (d, ²) (9)
In what follows, we explore the equilibria of four economies: the closed economy and three
trading economies. Let autarkic equilibrium variables be denoted with a subscript A. We
denote equilibrium variables in the full trading equilibrium with a subscript T . Our partial
trading economy with ζ = bm = 1 is equivalent to the open economy studied by Melitz (2003)
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with trade in final goods but no trade in intermediates and we denote this economy with an X
subscript. We also consider an economy with trade in intermediate goods but no trade in final
goods and denote this economy with an M subscript.
Thus, the equilibrium price index and aggregate revenue in economy S ∈ {A, T,X,M} are
denoted PS and RS respectively. Evaluating equations (7) and (9) at these equilibrium values
allows us to determine equilibrium revenue and profit functions for a final goods producer in
each economy.
3.2 Exit, Export, and Import Decisions
3.2.1 Exit Decision
We focus on stationary equilibria in which aggregate variables remain constant over time. Each
firm’s value function in economy S ∈ {A, T,X,M} is given by the maximum of the exiting value,
which is assumed to be zero, and the present value of total sum of expected profits as:
VS(ϕ) = max
{
0,
∞∑
t=0
(1− ξ)tE²t
(
max
dt∈{0,1}2
piS(ϕ, dt, ²t)
)}
= max
{
0, E²
(
max
d∈{0,1}2
piS(ϕ, d, ²)
ξ
)}
,
where the second equality follows because ² is independently distributed over time. Now since
profits are strictly increasing in ϕ, there exists a cutoff productivity, ϕ∗S such that a firm will exit
if ϕ < ϕ∗S where ϕ∗S is characterized by E²
(
maxd∈{0,1}2
piS(ϕ
∗
S ,d,²)
ξ
)
= 0. Using methods similar
to those employed by Melitz (2003) we can show that the cutoff productivities for each economy
exist, are unique, and satisfy rS(ϕ∗S, 0, 0) = σf. This also implies that the revenue of a firm can
be written as
rS(ϕ, d) = bd
x
x b
dm
m
(
ϕ
ϕ∗S
)σ−1
σf. (10)
3.2.2 Export and Import Decisions
For the full trading economy, we now consider the export and import decisions for firms which
choose not to exit. Define the following function of inherent productivity:
Φ(ϕ) ≡
(
ϕ
ϕ∗T
)σ−1 ( f
N
)
.
For convenience, we can reference firms of different productivity levels by Φ where the depen-
dence on ϕ is understood. We refer to this variable as relative productivity. Using equations
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(9) and (10), we can write profits in terms of Φ:
pˆi(Φ, d, ²) = bd
x
x b
dm
m NσΦ− F (d, ²).
To obtain the export and import decision rules as a function of a firm’s productivity and
fixed import cost, we define the following variables. Let Φx(dm, ²) be implicitly defined by
pˆi(Φx(dm, ²), 1, dm, ²) = pˆi(Φx(dm, ²), 0, dm, ²) or
Φx(dm, ²) =
ζd
m
fx + dm(ζd
m − 1)(fm + ²)
bdmm (bx − 1)
. (11)
So a firm with import status dm, fixed import cost shock ², and relative productivity Φx(dm, ²)
will be indifferent between exporting and not exporting. Similarly, we have
Φm(dx, ²) =
ζd
x
(fm + ²) + dx(ζd
x − 1)fx
bdxx (bm − 1)
(12)
where a firm with dx, ², and relative productivity Φm(dx, ²) will be indifferent between importing
and not importing. Finally, let
Φxm(²) =
ζ(fx + fm + ²)
(bxbm − 1) . (13)
So a firm with fixed import cost shock ², and relative productivity Φxm(²) will be indifferent
between participating in both exporting and importing markets and not participating in either
market.
We can graph each of the variables defined in equations (11)–(13) as a function of fixed
import costs, fm+², to determine firms’ export and import choices. Figure 1 graphs these cutoff
functions for the case with no complementarities in fixed costs, i.e. ζ = 1. Note that Φ(ϕ∗T ) =
f
N
so active firms are those with Φ ≥ fN . As the figure demonstrates, the space is partitioned
into four areas (with boundaries given by the dark solid lines) according to firms’ export and
import choices. Firms with relatively low productivity and low fixed cost of importing will
choose to import but not export. Firms with relatively low productivity and higher fixed cost of
importing will choose to neither import nor export. Firms with relatively high productivity and
high fixed cost of importing will choose to export but not import. Finally, firms with relatively
high productivity will choose to both import and export.
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We can also demonstrate the effect of complementarities in the fixed costs of importing and
exporting. Recall that a decrease in ζ represents an increase in complementarities. Examination
of equations (11)-(13) shows that a decrease in ζ will shift down and decrease the slopes of
Φm(1, ·), Φx(1, ·), and Φxm(·). As can be seen from Figure 2, each of these changes would serve
to increase the measure of firms choosing to both export and import and decrease the measure
of firms in each of the other three areas. The shaded area in the figure indicates the firms which
became active in both exporting and importing who were either active in only one market or in
neither market in the absence of complementarities of fixed costs. This is intuitive as an increase
in the complementarities should increase the fraction of firms which choose to engage in both
activities.
3.3 Autarky and Trading Equilibria
All variables in the stationary equilibrium for each economy can be determined once we deter-
mine the cutoff variable for operation, ϕ∗S. We now seek to characterize the equations which
determine these cutoff variables.
Let νS(ϕ∗S, d) denote the equilibrium fraction of firms that have export/import status equal
to d in economy S ∈ {A, T,X,M}. Let average profits within each group of firms according to
export/import status be denoted p˜iS(ϕ∗S, d). Then, average overall profit, p¯iS, can be expressed
as
p¯iS =
∑
d∈{0,1}2
νS(ϕ∗S, d)p˜iS(ϕ
∗
S, d). (14)
This equation, corresponding to the “zero cutoff profit condition” in Melitz (2003), provides an
equilibrium relationship between average overall profit, p¯iS, and the cutoff productivity, ϕ∗S.
The second equilibrium equation is given by the free-entry condition which guarantees that
the ex-ante value of an entrant must be equal zero:
(1−G(ϕ∗S))
(
p¯iS
ξ
)
− fe = 0. (15)
Solving these two equations (14)-(15) for the two unknowns p¯iS and ϕ∗S, allows us to uniquely
determine the equilibrium cutoff productivity in each economy.
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3.4 Effects of Trade
We first examine the effects of trade on the decision to operate. Using methods similar to those
employed by Melitz (2003), we can demonstrate that either type of trade increases the cutoff
productivity for operation, i.e. ϕ∗A < ϕ∗X < ϕ∗T and ϕ∗A < ϕ∗M < ϕ∗T . Thus opening trade in either
final goods or intermediates or both causes firms with lower inherent productivity to exit. In the
economy with no importing, this result is identical to that identified by Melitz (2003) where the
exportation of final goods induces a reallocation of labour from less productive firms to more
productive firms. We find that allowing firms to import intermediates leads to even more exit
of less productive firms.
We also find that when the economy moves from autarky to full trade, market shares are
shifted away from firms which do not engage in trade (low productivity firms) to firms which
both export and import (high productivity firms). This reallocation of market shares from
less productive to more productive firms when an economy opens for full trade increases a
productivity average measured using firms revenue shares as weights. This effect was identified
by Melitz (2003) in the economy with no importing of intermediates. If the economy also opens
to intermediates imports this effect is strengthened because of additional resource reallocation
and a direct increase in productivity from the use of additional intermediates.
An additional interesting result is that if the returns to importing intermediates, bm, are
large enough, then a firm which chooses to export but not import in the open economy will also
lose market share. This is because a firm which chooses to only export is at a disadvantage
relative to its domestic and foreign competitors who are importing intermediates and such a
firm may lose market share when the economy opens to full trade. For similar reasons, when the
returns to exporting, bx, are large enough, then a firm which chooses to import but not export
in the open economy will also lose market share.
It is also easy to show that the mass of operating firms must fall when an economy opens
to either type of trade. This is similar to the findings of Melitz (2003) and is an example of a
selection effect as discussed in the trade literature with increasing returns and free entry (see,
for example, Krugman, 1979). Our environment identifies an additional mechanism arising from
the presence of imported intermediates that strengthens this selection effect.
We are also interested in the normative effects of trade and, as in Melitz (2003) use the
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equilibrium aggregate price index in each equilibrium to obtain a welfare measure: WS = 1PS . In
moving from autarky to an economy with trade in final goods, consumer welfare is impacted by
two effects. The number of varieties available to the consumer changes and aggregate produc-
tivity increases. In the trading economy with no trade in final goods but trade in intermediates,
consumer welfare is only affected by the latter effect and trade in intermediates impacts posi-
tively on welfare. In the economies with trade in final goods, the number of varieties available to
the consumer in the open economies may be higher or lower than the number of varieties avail-
able to the consumer in autarky. If the number of varieties available to the consumer is higher
in trade, then welfare is also enhanced by this effect but if it falls then welfare is negatively im-
pacted. However, as in Melitz (2003), we can show the increase in welfare from the productivity
gain dominates and welfare is higher in any of the trading economies than in autarky and full
trade generates higher welfare than partial trade, i.e. WA < WX < WT and WA < WM < WT .
3.5 Restrictions on Trade in Intermediate Goods
We now briefly examine the effects of a restriction on the importation of intermediates on aggre-
gate productivity and export activity. We already argued above that prohibiting the importation
of intermediates will have a negative effect on average productivity and welfare. We may also
interpret an increase in the transportation costs associated with shipping intermediates, τm,
as an increase in barriers to trade in those goods and can show that this would also decrease
average productivity and welfare.
Furthermore, allowing intermediate imports will allow a larger fraction of firms to enter the
export market. This is because the use of imported intermediates increases the productivity of
firms through the increasing returns to variety in production. Thus, a restriction on imports
decreases export activity and hence, import protection acts as export destruction. Figure 3
demonstrates this effect when imported intermediates are prohibited for the case where there are
no fixed cost complementarities. The shaded area in that figure shows the fraction of exporting
firms which stop exporting when imports are prohibited, and, hence the export destruction
due to import protection. Of course, in the presence of fixed cost complementarities, export
destruction due to restrictions on trade in intermediate goods is even more pronounced.
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4 Structural Estimation
4.1 The Environment
In this section, we develop an empirical model based on the theoretical model presented in the
previous section. The empirical model retains the basic structure of the theoretical model but
includes additional cost shocks. We introduce stochastic fixed costs of exporting and importing
and cost shocks associated with exiting.10 With these shocks, the empirical model does not have
closed-form characterizations of firms’ decisions which complicates the estimation.
Extending the framework developed by Rust (1987), we consider a nested logit dynamic
programming model in which the set of alternatives are partitioned into subsets, or nests, as
follows.11 First, a firm draws a cost shock associated with the exiting decision χ ∈ {0, 1},
denoted by ²χt ≡ (²χt (0), ²χt (1)). Here, χ = 0 implies that a firm exits while χ = 1 implies that
a firm continues to operate. We assume that ²χt is independent of alternatives and is randomly
drawn from the extreme-value distribution with scale parameter %χ.
If a firm decides to stay, it then draws stochastic fixed costs associated with its export/import
decision. These are similar to the random fixed cost of importing in the theoretical model
but here we allow for a stochastic cost for every status. We partition the set of alternative
export/import choices into two subsets: D0 ≡ {(0, 0)} and D1 ≡ {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. The cost
shocks associated with the decision to trade or not trade, denoted by ²Dt (D) for D ∈ {D0, D1},
are randomly drawn from the extreme-value distribution with scale parameter %D. Let ²Dt ≡
(²Dt (D0), ²
D
t (D1))
′. If a firm decides to engage in trade by choosing D = D1, it then draws
additional choice-dependent cost shocks associated with its export and import decisions. These
are denoted ²dt (d) for d ∈ D1 and are drawn from the extreme-value distribution with scale
parameter %d. Let ²dt ≡ (²dt (1, 0), ²dt (0, 1), ²dt (1, 1))′. Figure 4 shows the tree diagram for firm’s
choice within a period.
The Bellman’s equations which characterize the optimization problem for an incumbent firm
10Adding these cost shocks is necessary to explain certain observations in the data. For example, in the absence
of exiting cost shocks, the theoretical model predicts that all firms with productivity below the cutoff level will
exit. This, however, is inconsistent with the existence of many small firms in our data.
11A nested logit model allows for richer substitution patterns across alternatives than does a standard multino-
mial logit model. See, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985).
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Figure 4: Tree Diagram of Firm’s Choice
with inherent productivity ϕ is written as follows:
V (ϕ) =
∫
max{²χ(0),W (ϕ) + ²χ(1)}dHχ(²χ), (16)
W (ϕ) =
∫
max{J(ϕ,D0) + ²D(D0), J(ϕ,D1) + ²D(D1)}dHD(²D), (17)
J(ϕ,D) =
 pi(ϕ, 0, 0) + β(1− ξ)V (ϕ), for D = D0,∫ (maxd∈D1 pi(ϕ, d′) + β(1− ξ)V (ϕ) + ²d(d′)) dHd(²d) for D = D1, (18)
where Hχ, HD, and Hd represent the cumulative distribution functions of ²χ, ²D, and ²d,
respectively, while β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
To clarify these modifications, we describe the timing of the decisions of an incumbent
using equations (16)-(18). At the beginning of every period, a firm with value V (ϕ) draws the
idiosyncratic cost shocks associated with exiting decisions, ²χ, and decides whether to exit or
continue to operate. If the firm decides to exit, it receives the terminal value of ²χ(0). If the
firm decides to operate with the continuation value of W (ϕ), it will then draw the cost shocks
associated with trading decisions, ²D, and decide whether it will engage in trading activities.
This trading decision is described in the right hand side of equation (17), where J(ϕ,D) denotes
the continuation value under a trading choice D ∈ {D0, D1}. If the firm decides to trade, it
draws the cost shocks, ²d, and makes export/import decisions. At the end of the period, the
firm faces a possibility of a large negative shock that causes it to exit with probability ξ.
With the solution to the functional equations (16)-(18), and using the properties of the
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extreme-value distributed random variables (see, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985),
the conditional choice probabilities of exiting and export/import decisions are derived as follows.
First, taking into account the exogenous exiting probability of ξ, the probabilities of staying
(χ = 1) and exiting (χ = 0) are given by:
P (χ = 1|ϕ) = (1− ξ) exp(W (ϕ)/%
χ)
exp(0) + exp(W (ϕ)/%χ)
, (19)
and P (χ = 0|ϕ) = 1 − P (χ = 1|ϕ). Conditional on χ = 1 (i.e., continuously operating), the
choice probabilities of d ∈ {0, 1}2 are given by:
P (d|ϕ, χ = 1) =
 P (D0|ϕ, χ = 1) for d ∈ D0,P (D1|ϕ, χ = 1)P (d|ϕ, χ = 1, D = D1), for d ∈ D1, (20)
where
P (D|ϕ, χ = 1) = exp(J(ϕ,D)/%
D)∑
D′∈{D0,D1} exp(J(ϕ,D
′)/%D)
,
P (d|ϕ, χ = 1, D = D1) = exp([pi(ϕ, d) + β(1− ξ)V (ϕ)]/%
d)∑
d′∈D1 exp([pi(ϕ, d
′) + β(1− ξ)V (ϕ)]/%d) .
Equations (64)-(65) define the conditional choice probabilities of exiting and export/import
decisions, which follows a familiar nested logit formula (c.f., McFadden, 1978).12
We focus on a stationary equilibrium in which the distribution of ϕ is constant over time.
We assume that the logarithm of plant-specific productivity, lnϕ, is drawn upon entry from
N(0, σ2ϕ), where its density function is denoted by gϕ(ϕ). This productivity level is constant
after the initial draw. The expected value of an entering firm is then given by
∫
V (ϕ)gϕ(ϕ)dϕ,
where V (·) is given in (16). Under free entry, this value must be equal to the fixed entry cost
fe: ∫
V (ϕ)gϕ(ϕ)dϕ = fe. (21)
12There are important differences, however, between static nested logit models and the dynamic model we
consider here. First, in static models, the property of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) holds within
each nest but the IIA property no longer holds even within a nest in dynamic models because the continuation
value depends on the attributes of other alternatives outside of the nest (c.f., Rust, 1994). Second, while a static
model typically has a closed-form specification in parameters (e.g., linear-in-parameters), the conditional choice
probabilities (64)-(65) do not have a closed-form expression in parameters; instead, their evaluations require the
solution to the functional equations (16)-(18). It is computationally intensive, therefore, to evaluate the conditional
choice probabilities in our dynamic model although the extreme-value specification substantially simplifies the
computation by avoiding the need for multi-dimensional numerical integrations in (16)-(18).
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We denote the stationary distribution of ϕ among incumbents by g∗ϕ(ϕ). Stationarity requires
that, for each “type” ϕ, the number of exiting firms is equal to the number of successful new
entrants so that
MP (χ = 0|ϕ)g∗ϕ(ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exits
= MeP (χ = 1|ϕ)gϕ(ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
entrants
for all ϕ,
where M is a total mass of incumbents and Me is a total mass of plants that attempt to enter
into the market. This implies that the stationary distribution g∗ϕ(ϕ) can be computed as:
g∗ϕ(ϕ) =
Me
M
P (χ = 1|ϕ)
P (χ = 0|ϕ)gϕ(ϕ), (22)
where MeM = 1/
∫ P (χ=1|ϕ)
P (χ=0|ϕ)gϕ(ϕ)dϕ since
∫
g∗ϕ(ϕ)dϕ = 1.
4.2 The Likelihood Function
We define the following functions of the iceberg shipping costs:
zx ≡ ln(Nτ1−σx ), zm ≡ ln(Nτ1−γm ). (23)
The basic specification assumes that shipping costs and, therefore, zx and zm are the same across
plants. Below we extend the model to allow for differences in zx and zm across plants.
Total revenue, export intensity, and import intensity are assumed to be measured with error.
We also allow for labor augmented technological change at the annual rate of αt. Modifying the
revenue functions and the intermediate demand functions to include measurement error and a
time trend, we use equations (3), (6), and (7) to specify the logarithm of observed total revenue,
export intensity, and import intensity as:
ln rit = α0 + αtt+ ln[1 + exp(zx)]dxit + αm ln[1 + exp(zm)]d
m
it + lnϕi + ω1,it, (24)
lnNrfit/rit = ln[exp(zx)/(1 + exp(zx))] + ω2,it, if d
x
it = 1, (25)
lnXmit /Xit = αm ln[exp(zm)/(1 + exp(zm)] + ω3,it, if d
m
it = 1. (26)
Here Nrfit/rit is the observed ratio of export revenue to total revenue; X
m
it /Xit is the observed
ratio of imported intermediate costs to total intermediate costs; and ω1,it, ω2,it, and ω3,it are
measurement errors in the total revenue, export intensity, and import intensity, respectively.
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Given these specifications for revenue, (detrended) firm’s profit may be expressed in terms
of reduced-form parameters as:13
pi(ϕi, dit) = (1/σ)r(ϕi, dit)− F (dit), (27)
where
r(ϕi, dit) = exp(α0 + ln[1 + exp(zx)]dxit + αm ln[1 + exp(zm)]d
m
it + lnϕi) (28)
F (dit) = f + ζd
x
itd
m
it (fxdxit + fmd
m
it ).
The conditional choice probabilities (64)-(65) may be evaluated using the solution to the Bellman
equations (16)-(18) with the profit function (27).
We assume that, conditional on (ϕi, dxit, d
m
it ), ωit ≡ (ω1,it, ω2,it, ω3,it)′ is randomly drawn from
N(0,Σω) and we denote its probability density function by gω(·). We reparametrize Σω using
the unique lower triangular Cholesky decomposition as Σω = ΛωΛ′ω and denote the (j, k)-th
component of Λω by λj,k. Since whether we observe the export/import intensities or not depends
on the export/import choices, the likelihood contribution from ωit depends on the decision dit.
In the appendix, we derive the conditional density function for observed components of ωit
conditional on dit and we denote it by gω(ωit|dit).
Denote the parameter vector to be estimated by
θ = (α0, αt, f, fx, fm, ζ, αm, zm, zx, ξ, %χ, %D, %d, σϕ, λ11, λ21, λ22, λ31, λ32, λ33)′.
The parameter vector θ is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood.14
Let Ti,0 be the first year in which firm i appears in the data. Conditioning on ϕi, the
likelihood contribution from the observation of plant i for t > Ti,0 is computed as:
Lit(θ|ϕi) =

P (χit = 0|ϕi) for χit = 0,
P (χit = 1|ϕi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Staying
P (dit|ϕi, χit = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export/Import
gω(ω˜it(ϕi)|dit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue/Intensity
for χit = 1,
13We consider a “detrended” version of firm’s problem by using the trend-adjusted discount factor β exp(αt) in
place of the discount factor β in solving the Bellman’s equation.
14The discount factor β is not estimated but is set to 0.95. It is difficult to identify the discount factor β in
dynamic discrete choice models (c.f., Rust, 1987).
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where gω(ω˜it(ϕi)|dit) is the likelihood contribution from the observations of revenues, export
intensity, and import intensity (see the appendix). Note that in estimating the revenue function
given by (24), the endogeneity of export/import decisions as well as the sample selection due
to endogenous exiting decisions are dealt with by simultaneously considering the likelihood
contribution from export/import/exiting decisions.
For the initial period of t = Ti,0, we observe a plant that decided to stay in the market so
that the likelihood is conditioned on χit = 1,
Lit(θ|ϕi) = P (dit|ϕi, χit = 1)gω(ω˜it(ϕi)|dit).
The likelihood contribution from plant i conditioned on ϕi is
Li(θ|ϕi) =
Ti,1∏
t=Ti,0
Lit(θ|ϕi),
where Ti,1 is the last year in which firm i appears in the data.
Since we do not observe ϕi, we integrate out the unobserved ϕi to compute the likelihood
contribution from plant i observation. The distribution of ϕi crucially depends on whether
a plant is observed in the initial sample period or not. If plant i is observed in the initial
sample period, we integrate out ϕi using the stationary distribution g∗ϕ(ϕ) given in (22) while,
if plant i enters into the sample after the initial sample period, we use the distribution of initial
draws upon successful entry given by ge(ϕ) =
P (χ=1|ϕ)∫
P (χ=1|ϕ′)gϕ(ϕ′)dϕ′ gϕ(ϕ). Thus, the likelihood
contribution from plant i is
Li(θ) =

∫
Li(θ|ϕ′)g∗ϕ(ϕ′)dϕ′ for Ti,0 = 1990,∫
Li(θ|ϕ′)ge(ϕ′)dϕ′ for Ti,0 > 1990.
The parameter vector θ can be estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the likelihood function
L(θ) =
N∑
i=1
lnLi(θ). (29)
Evaluation of the log-likelihood involves solving the dynamic programming problem that
approximates the Bellman equations (16)-(18) by discretization of state space.15 For each can-
15We use the Gauss-Quadrature method with thirty grid points to approximate the state space of ϕ.
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didate parameter vector θ, we solve the discretized version of (16)-(18) and then obtain the
choice probabilities, (64) and (65), as well as the stationary distribution from the associated
policy function. Once the choice probabilities and the stationary distribution are obtained for a
particular candidate parameter vector θ, we may then evaluate the log-likelihood function (29).
Repeating this process, we can maximize (29) over the parameter space of θ to find the estimate.
4.3 Reduced-form vs. Structural Parameters
It is important to note that equations (24)-(26) are reduced-form specifications. In particular, we
have the following relationships between reduced-form parameters and structural parameters:16
α0 = ln
[
(Γ(σ − 1)/σ)σ−1RP σ−1
]
,
αm =
(σ − 1)(1− α)
γ − 1 .
Since α0 and αm are not structural parameters, they could be affected by policy changes. In
particular, any policy change that will affect the aggregate price P will lead to a change in α0.
Identifying such a relationship is especially important in conducting counterfactual experiments.
As we discuss later, counterfactual policy experiments in this paper explicitly take into account
equilibrium price responses using our knowledge of the relationship between the reduced-form
parameter α0 and the aggregate price P .
4.4 Identification
The identification of parameters in the revenue function given by (24) follows from the within-
plant variations in dxit and d
m
it together with the moment restriction E[ω1,it−ω1,i(t−1)|dxi , dmi ] = 0
obtained from taking first differences in (24). Furthermore, the moment condition E[ω3,it|dmit =
1] = 0 from (26) provides one more restriction on the relationship between αm and zm and, thus,
αm and zm are separately identified.
Having identified the revenue function (24), we may identify the fixed cost of operating
f and the scale parameter %χ for exiting shocks as follows. For simplicity, suppose that the
time-dimension is long enough to identify the value of plant-specific productivity ϕ for each
16Also, with abuse of notation, we replace (σ− 1) lnϕ by lnϕ since (σ− 1) cannot be separately identified from
the variance of lnϕ.
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plant from revenue observations using equation (24).17 Then, since the exiting probabilities are
strictly increasing in the fixed cost of operating, f , the variation of plant-specific productivity ϕ
and how its values relate to the exiting probabilities identify the parameter f . Furthermore, the
elasticities of exiting probabilities with respect to the value of productivity ϕ tend to decrease
as the variance of exiting shocks increases; thus, the variation of the ϕ’s and the difference
in exiting probabilities across different ϕ’s identify the scale parameter %χ separately from the
parameter f .18 Using a similar identification scheme, we may identify the other fixed cost and
scale parameters from the variation of the ϕ’s and the variation of export/import probabilities.
In discrete choice models, the scale of profit function cannot be identified because multiplying
the profit function of each alternative by a positive constant does not change the optimal choice.
For identification, we normalize the profit function given by (28).19
4.5 Extended Model with Heterogeneous Transportation Costs
Shipping costs may differ across plants, depending on where they locate and what types of
goods they produce and purchase. In this section, we extend the basic model by incorporating
heterogeneity in the iceberg shipping costs of exporting and importing.
There are at least two reasons why we are particularly interested in this extension. First, as
reported in Section 2, export and import intensities differ substantially across plants in the data
but the basic model is unable to explain such differences. Heterogeneity in shipping costs may
be part of the reason why different plants choose different export/import intensities.20 Second,
it may provide an additional reason why some plants export or import while others do not; that
is, two plants with identical productivities may make different export/import choices because
they differ in their transportation costs. If we ignore heterogeneity in transportation costs,
we may possibly overestimate the importance of heterogeneity in productivity in explaining
heterogeneous export/import choices and its role in resource allocation across plants.
Our assumptions on heterogeneous transportation costs are similar to those on heterogeneous
17In practice, the time-dimension is short but, under the distributional assumptions on ϕ, we may identify each
plant’s likelihood of having a particular value of ϕ.
18The variance of exiting shocks is related to the scale parameter %χ as V ar(²χ(χ)) = (%
χpi)2
6
.
19Specifically, our normalization is such that, multiplying the profit function by σ, we estimate σ%χ, σ%D, σ%d,
σf , σfx, and σfm instead of %
χ, %D, %d, f , fx, and fx.
20Heterogeneity in export and import intensities may also be because plants differ in the number of trading
countries as Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004a) find in French data. Unfortunately, due to data limitations,
we are unable to determine with which countries a plant is trading.
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productivity. In particular, we assume that plant-specific transportation costs are drawn upon
entry and are constant after the initial draw. Note from (23) that heterogeneity in transportation
costs, τx and τm, translates into heterogeneity in zx and zm. We make distributional assumptions
that, conditional on lnϕ, the random variables zx and zm are independent of each other and are
drawn at the time of entry from normal distributions with the means µx and µm and variances
σ2x and σ
2
m, respectively. Thus, a plant’s type is characterized by a vector ηi = (lnϕi, zx,i, zm,i)
′
in the extended model.
The parameter vector to be estimated in the extended model is
θ = (α0, αt, f, fx, fm, ζf , αm, ξ, %χ, %D, %d, σϕ, µx, µm, σx, σm, λ11, λ21, λ22, λ31, λ32, λ33)′.
The distributional parameters for zx and zm are identified from export/import intensity obser-
vations in equations (25)-(26). We omit the details of the estimation procedure for the extended
model as it is very similar to that of the basic model.
4.6 Data
We use the Chilean manufacturing census for 1990-1996 which covers all plants with at least 10
employees.21 Our data set consists of unbalanced panel of 7231 plants, including all plants that
have been observed at least one year between 1990 and 1996.22 The original data set is available
from 1979 to 1996 but the value of export sales is reported only after 1990 and, thus, we exclude
the period before 1990. A detailed description of the data as well as Chilean industry trade
orientation up to 1986 is found in Liu (1993), Tybout (1996), and Pavcnik (2002).
We focus on the following seven observable variables: χit, rit, Nr
f
it, Xit, X
m
it , d
x
it, and d
m
it ,
where i represents plant’s identification and t indicates the year. We use the real values of
total sales for rit, where the manufacturing output price deflater is used to convert the nominal
value into the real value. Our measurement of intermediate inputs, Xit, include materials, fuels,
and electricity while we use the reported value of imported materials for Xmit . Accordingly, the
21A unit of observation in our sample is a plant not a firm. This is due to limitations of our data set.
Unfortunately, we are unable to capture the extent to which multi-plant firms make joint decisions on exporting
and importing across different plants they own. Neither are we able to examine whether or not a plant belongs to
multinational firm although exporting and importing by multinational firms are important topics (e.g., Helpman
et al., 2004; Yi, 2003).
22Three plant observations are dropped out of the sample because their values of intermediate inputs are zero
at least in one year.
25
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Total Intermediate Labour Export Imported Export Import Entry Exiting
Salesa Inputsa Salesa,b Inputsa,b Intensityb Intensityb Ratesc Ratesd
1990 5,025 3,082 80.7 5,682 1,622 0.30 0.29 — —
(33,443) (23,613) (151.5) (33,770) (4,599) (0.33) (0.25) — —
1991 4,974 3,685 80.4 4,115 1,693 0.26 0.29 0.08 0.05
(29,875) (24,322) (153.2) (20,855) (4,663) (0.32) (0.26) — —
1992 5,280 4,250 82.0 4,595 1,655 0.25 0.29 0.07 0.06
(30,322) (26,440) (163.7) (26,820) (4,059) (0.30) (0.24) — —
1993 5,452 4,684 81.9 3,953 1,794 0.25 0.29 0.07 0.07
(29,744) (27,337) (156.3) (17,142) (6,474) (0.30) (0.24) — —
1994 5,613 5,268 81.7 4,274 1,957 0.23 0.29 0.06 0.06
(29,523) (30,531) (156.2) (19,514) (13,061) (0.28) (0.25) — —
1995 5,982 5,981 81.6 4,959 2,298 0.25 0.29 0.08 0.08
(29,947) (32,636) (151.5) (20,387) (15,456) (0.29) (0.25) — —
1996 6,068 6,245 76.9 4,832 1,805 0.25 0.29 0.14 0.08
(31,367) (35,738) (143.0) (17,205) (4,912) (0.29) (0.25) — —
1990-96 ave 5,485 4,742 80.8 4,630 1,832 0.25 0.29 0.08 0.06
Notes: Reported numbers are sample means (standard deviations in parentheses). (a) in units of thousands of US dollars in
1990. (b) computed using the sample of exporting (importing) plants for export (import) intensity. (c) the number of new
entrants divided by the total number of plants. (d) the number of exiting plants divided by the total number of plants.
import intensity Xmit /Xit is measured by the ratio of imported materials to total intermediate
costs. On the other hand, the export intensity Nrfit/rit is measured by the ratio of export
sales to total sales. The export/import status, (dxit, d
m
it ), is identified from the data by checking
if the value of export sales and/or the value of imported materials are zero or positive. The
entry/exiting decisions, χit, can be identified in the data by looking at the number of workers
across years.
Descriptive statistics in addition to those presented in Section 2 are provided in Table 5.
Examining the standard deviations for total sales, export sales, and various inputs, we note
that the production scale varies substantially across plants. Neither export intensity nor import
intensity appears to have any trend; from the viewpoint of the model, this suggests no trend
in transportation costs during this period. There are substantial plant turnovers every year;
on average, 424 plants enter into the market every year while 344 plants exit from the market.
Having a large number of entrants and exiting plants in the sample is important for identifying
the parameters determining the exiting choice probabilities as well as the distribution of initial
productivity draws.
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Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameters Basic Model Extended Model
α0 -0.804 (0.003) -0.456 (0.003)
σf 3.270 (0.132) 7.575 (1.072)
σfx 1.196 (0.028) 0.127 (0.001)
σfm 0.881 (0.021) 0.088 (0.001)
ζ 0.740 (0.007) 0.886 (0.005)
σ%d 0.209 (0.004) 0.0186 (0.0003)
σ%D 0.741 (0.017) 0.0518 (0.0009)
σ%χ 47.998 (1.323) 202.854 (16.061)
αt 0.040 (0.001) 0.040 (0.001)
ξ 0.0016 (0.0001) 0.0039 (0.0008)
αm 0.719 (0.006) 0.595 (0.003)
λ11 0.333 (0.001) 0.338 (0.001)
λ22 1.856 (0.014) 1.103 (0.006)
λ21 0.030 (0.023) 0.190 (0.012)
λ33 1.192 (0.007) 0.865 (0.005)
λ32 -0.346 (0.014) 0.098 (0.016)
λ31 -0.130 (0.013) 0.140 (0.009)
σϕ 0.964 (0.001) 1.061 (0.001)
zx -2.534 (0.014)
zm -2.358 (0.020)
µx -4.439 (0.016)
µm -4.099 (0.020)
σx 1.863 (0.009)
σm 1.760 (0.013)
σfe 122.00 540.50
log-likelihood -91305.27 -79236.27
No. of Plants 7231
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The parameters are evaluated units of millions of US dollars in 1990.
4.7 Estimation Results
Table 6 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the empirical models and their asymp-
totic standard errors, which are computed using the outer product of gradients estimator. The
parameters are evaluated in units of millions of US dollars in 1990. The standard errors are
generally small. We first discuss the results of the basic model in detail and then compare them
with those of the extended model.
4.7.1 Results of the Basic Model
In the basic model, the estimated fixed cost of operating in the market is fˆ = 3.27/σ million US
dollars. If, say, σ = 5, (which implies a mark-up for final goods equal to approximately 25%)
then the estimated fixed cost is approximately equal to 622 thousand dollars. The estimated
fixed costs for export and import are also substantial: fˆx = 1.20/σ and fˆm = 0.88/σ. The
parameter determining the degree of complementarity in fixed export and import costs, ζ, is
estimated as 0.740, indicating that a firm can save more than 26 percent of per-period fixed cost
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associated with trade by engaging in both export and import activities.
The estimated magnitudes of the shocks associated with the exiting decision and the ex-
port/import decisions are substantial relative to the per-period profit. The estimate of ρd =
0.21/σ implies the standard error of pi√
6
× 0.21/σ = 0.27/σ in export/import cost shocks, which
is more than one-sixth of the average incumbent’s profit from domestic sales.23 The estimate
of ρD = 0.74/σ is more than three times as large as that of ρd. The estimate of ρχ is much
larger than ρd or ρD and implies that the standard error of the shocks associated with the ex-
iting decision is pi√
6
× 48.00/σ = 61.56/σ, which is more than 50 times as large as the average
incumbent’s profit from domestic sales.24
The estimates of αm, zm, and zx indicate that importing materials from abroad has a sub-
stantial impact of a 6.5[= αˆm ln(1 + exp(zˆm))] percent increase on the total revenues while
exporting increases the total revenues by 7.6[= ln(1 + exp(zˆx))] percent. These estimates are
similar in magnitude to the estimates in Table 4 based on the fixed effects regression.25 In
particular, the regression results on total sales in Table 4 suggest that the import premia are
5-7% while the export premia are 8-11%.
These estimates also imply an average export intensity equal to 7.3% and an average import
intensity equal to 17.2%. Thus the model is broadly consistent with the relatively low levels of
these variables as documented in Section 2 and by other authors for exports (see, for example,
Brooks, 2005). However, these values are well below the means of 25% and 29% reported in
Section 2.
In the model, firms with higher productivity are more likely to survive than lower pro-
ductivity firms. Table 7 shows the importance of such a selection mechanism.26 The average
productivity among incumbents at the steady state is 2.6 times as high as the average produc-
tivity across initial draws in the basic model, indicating that the selection through endogenous
23The average productivity at the steady state is φ = 2.64. Then, the average incumbent’s profit from domestic
sales is computed as 1.18/σ[= (1/σ) exp(αˆ0)× 2.64].
24The standard error of the exiting shocks is even larger for the extended model. A different source of unobserved
heterogeneity, such as permanent heterogeneity in the per-period fixed cost of operating, may be part of the
explanation for this large standard error. Other possibilities are to consider more realistic productivity dynamics,
such as those based on the first order autoregressive process, as well as to incorporate the sunk costs for exporting
and importing. These extensions are the focus of our future work.
25The fixed effects regression controls for endogeneity of export/import decisions but does not control for sample
selection due to endogenous exiting decisions.
26The numbers reported in Tables 7-12 are directly computed using the approximated stationary density func-
tion based on equation (22) rather than simulating the data from the estimated models. The approximation
methods are presented in a supplementary appendix which is available upon request.
28
Table 7: Mean of Productivity
Basic Model Extended Model
Mean of ϕ at Entry Trial 1.000 1.000
Mean of ϕ among All plants at Steady State 2.639 1.387
Mean of ϕ among Exporters at Steady State 6.567 3.356
Mean of ϕ among Importers at Steady State 6.071 3.170
Mean of ϕ among Ex/Importers at Steady State 8.105 4.511
Notes: The reported numbers are relative to the productivity level at entry. In particular, the original numbers are divided
by the mean of ϕ at entry (i.e.,
∫
ϕgϕ(ϕ)dϕ). “Exporters” are plants that export while “Importers” are plants that import.
“Ex/Importers” represent plants that both export and import.
exiting plays an important role in determining aggregate productivity. Furthermore, as the last
three rows show, higher productivity firms are more likely to export and import. Both exporters
and importers are more than twice as productive as the average firm at the steady state while
the firms that both export and import are about three times as productive as the average.
4.7.2 Results of the Extended Model
We now discuss the results of the extended model with heterogeneous transportation costs. We
focus our discussion on the major differences between the basic and extended models while
comparing the predictions of these two models with the actual data.
In Table 6, comparing µx and µm in the extended model with zx and zm in the basic model,
we note that the estimated means of transportation costs in the extended model are much larger
than those in the basic model. In particular, for an “average” plant with zx = µˆx and zm = µˆm,
exporting increases total revenue by only 1.2[= ln(1 + exp(µˆx))] percent while importing has a
small impact of a 1.0[= αˆm ln(1 + exp(µˆm))] percent. Thus, for many plants, the gains from
exporting and importing are quite low, providing an explanation for why a large fraction of
plants are neither exporting nor importing. Nonetheless, because of substantial heterogeneity
in transportation costs as indicated by the estimates of σx and σm, a non-negligible fraction of
plants face small transportation costs and are willing to engage in export and import activities.
The estimated fixed costs for export and import, fx and fm, in the extended model are
approximately one-tenth of the estimates in the basic model. Large fixed costs for export and
import are needed in the basic model to explain the fact that only a small fraction of plants
export and/or import. On the other hand, as discussed above, the low estimates for µx and µm
in the extended model imply that many plants have little incentive to export or import and,
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Table 8: Distribution of Export/Import Status and Market Shares (Actual vs. Predicted)
Export/Import Status
(1) No-Export (2) Export (3) No-Export (4) Export (2)+(4) (3)+(4)
/No-Import /No-Import /Import /Import Export Import
Actual
Dist. of Ex/Im Status 0.686 0.086 0.120 0.108 0.194 0.228
Market Share 0.227 0.187 0.145 0.441 0.628 0.586
Basic Model
Dist. of Ex/Im Status 0.695 0.089 0.129 0.088 0.177 0.216
Market Share 0.060 0.259 0.237 0.444 0.703 0.681
Extended Model
Dist. of Ex/Im Status 0.713 0.087 0.114 0.087 0.173 0.200
Market Share 0.344 0.144 0.165 0.347 0.490 0.512
therefore, many plants do not engage in trade even under the small values of fixed costs, fx and
fm.
In Table 7, the average productivity at the steady state is 1.4 times as high as the average
across initial draws in the extended model, which is still substantial but much lower than that
of the basic model. In the extended model, some low productivity plants may not exit if their
gains from trade are large due to their low transportation costs. As a result, the distribution of
productivity at the steady state is more skewed toward the left in the extended model, leading
to lower average productivity.
Table 8 compares the actual and the predicted distribution of export/import status as well
as market shares across different export/import states. In the data, while 68.6% of plants
are neither exporting nor importing, their market shares account only for a 22.7% of total
output. On the other hand, only 10.8% of plants are both exporting and importing but they
account for 44.1% of total output. Both empirical models qualitatively replicate these cross-
sectional patterns of exporters and importers although there are differences between the actual
and predicted magnitudes for market shares.
In Table 9, the extended model performs much better than the basic model in quantitatively
capturing the observed high degree of trade concentration. While in the actual data the top 1
percent of exporting plants account for 38.9 percent of total exports, in the basic model they
account only for 5.2 percent. On the other hand, the prediction of the extended model matches
the actual data quite well, quantitatively replicating the high degree of concentration of total
exports. Similarly, in replicating the high degree of import concentration, the extended model
substantially outperforms the basic model. The results indicate that heterogeneity in produc-
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Table 9: Export and Import Concentration (Actual vs. Predicted)
Actual Basic Model Extended Model
% of Total % of Total % of Total % of Total % of Total % of Total
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Top 1% 39.8 25.8 5.2 5.4 39.8 19.3
Top 5% 67.3 51.3 19.6 19.7 71.6 41.6
Top 10% 80.1 65.8 30.0 31.1 80.7 54.7
Table 10: Distribution of Export Intensity and Import Intensity (Actual vs. Predicted)
Predicted by Predicted by
Actual Basic Model Extended Model
Export Intensity Exporters Exporters Exporters All Plants at SS
Mean 0.252 0.073 0.161 0.047
Standard Error 0.302 — 0.188 0.101
Skewness 1.035 — 1.861 4.484
Import Intensity Importers Importers Importers All Plants at SS
Mean 0.290 0.172 0.269 0.134
Standard Error 0.249 — 0.167 0.138
Skewness 0.963 — 0.949 2.183
Export/Import Intensity Ex/Importers Ex/Importers Ex/Importers All Plants at SS
Corr(Nrf/r,Xm/X) -0.239 — -0.120 0.005
“All Plants at SS” refers to all plants at the steady state regardless of their export and import status while ”Ex/Importers”
refers to plants that both export and import.
tivity is not enough to replicate the observed magnitude of trade concentration; heterogeneity
in transportation costs is crucial to quantitatively explain the heavy concentration of exports
and imports among a small number of plants in our data.
Table 10 reports the actual and the predicted mean, standard error, and skewness of the
distributions for export and import intensities as well as the correlation between the export
intensity and the import intensity among exporters and/or importers. The extended model
replicates the actual mean of export and import intensities better than the basic model although
the extended model still under-predicts the actual mean of export intensities.
Examining the last two columns of Table 10, we notice that the distribution of export/import
intensities among all plants is quite different from the distribution among those who engage in
exporting and importing activities. For instance, while the mean of export (import) intensities
for all plants is only 4.7 (13.4) percent, the mean of export (import) intensities among exporters
(importers) is 16.1 (26.9) percent, indicating that plants with high export and import intensities
tend to self-select into exporting and importing.
31
4.8 Counterfactual Experiments
We now present the results of a series of counterfactual experiments which examine the effect
of trade barriers. To determine the full impact of a counterfactual experiment, it is crucial to
compute how the equilibrium aggregate price changes as a result of the experiment. This can
be done by finding a new equilibrium aggregate price at which the free entry condition (21)
holds in the experiment. The appendix provides a detailed description of how we compute the
equilibrium aggregate price under a counterfactual experiment; it is shown that we may identify
the logarithm of the equilibrium price change up to the parameter (σ − 1).
To quantitatively investigate the impact of international trade and export/import comple-
mentarities, we conduct four counterfactual experiments with the following counterfactual pa-
rameters:
(1) No Trade in Final Goods: fx →∞.
(2) No Trade in Intermediate Goods: fm →∞.
(3) Autarky: fx, fm →∞.
(4) No Complementarity in Fixed Trading Costs: ζ = 1.
Note that we can investigate the impact of counterfactual experiments on welfare by exam-
ining the aggregate price response. This is so because the aggregate price is inversely related to
welfare.27
Table 11 presents the results of counterfactual experiments using the estimated basic model.
To examine the importance of the equilibrium price response, we report results both with and
without the price response. According to the experiment, moving from autarky to trade de-
creases the equilibrium aggregate price by 6.1/(σ − 1) percent. This implies that if σ = 5,
exposure to full trade increases real income by (6.1/4=)1.52%, leading to a substantial increase
in welfare. This positive welfare effect occurs because under trade, more productive firms start
exporting and importing, which in turn increases aggregate labor demand and the real wage.
The impact of trade on aggregate productivity—measured by a productivity average using
the plants’ market shares as weights—can be understood by comparing “ln(Average ϕ) at Steady
27Recall that aggregate income is constant at the level of L. From the budget constraint PQ = L we have that
aggregate utility is given by U = Q = P−1L.
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Table 11: Counterfactual Experiments (Basic Model)
Counterfactual Experiments
Free (1) No Trade in (2) No Trade in (3) Autarky (4) No Comp.
Trade Final Goods Intermediates
With Equilibrium Price Effect
∆(σ − 1) lnP 0.000 0.056 0.059 0.061 0.019
ln(Average ϕ) at Steady State 0.000 -0.017 -0.017 -0.030 -0.002
ln(Average ϕ(1 + exp(zm)dm)αm ) 0.000 -0.036 -0.063 -0.076 -0.009
A Fraction of Exporters 0.177 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.125
A Fraction of Importers 0.216 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.160
Market Shares of Exporters 0.462 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.366
Market Shares of Importers 0.518 0.224 0.000 0.000 0.425
Without Equilibrium Price Effect
ln(Average ϕ) at Steady State 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.016 0.002
ln(Average ϕ(1 + exp(zm)dm)αm ) 0.000 -0.024 -0.050 -0.062 -0.004
A Fraction of Exporters 0.177 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.123
A Fraction of Importers 0.216 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.157
Market Shares of Exporters 0.462 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.363
Market Shares of Importers 0.518 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.421
Note: “Average ϕ” at Steady State is a productivity average using the plants’ combined revenues (or market shares) as
weights:
∫ ∑
d
ϕσ−1 r(ϕ,d)P (d|ϕ)∫ ∑
d′ r(ϕ
′,d′)P (d′|ϕ′)dg∗ϕ(ϕ′)
dg∗ϕ(ϕ).
Table 12: Counterfactual Experiments (Extended Model)
Counterfactual Experiments
Free (1) No Trade in (2) No Trade in (3) Autarky (4) No Comp.
Trade Final Goods Intermediates
With Equilibrium Price Effect
∆(1− σ) lnP 0.000 0.062 0.032 0.090 0.001
ln(Average ϕ) at Steady State 0.000 0.012 -0.008 0.001 0.001
ln(Average ϕ(1 + exp(zm)dm)αm ) 0.000 0.014 -0.090 -0.082 0.001
A Fraction of Exporters 0.173 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.160
A Fraction of Importers 0.200 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.184
Market Shares of Exporters 0.490 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.469
Market Shares of Importers 0.512 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.484
Without Equilibrium Price Effect
ln(Average ϕ) at Steady State 0.000 -0.007 -0.016 -0.028 0.000
ln(Average ϕ(1 + exp(zm)dm)αm ) 0.000 -0.005 -0.099 -0.111 0.000
A Fraction of Exporters 0.173 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.160
A Fraction of Importers 0.200 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.184
Market Shares of Exporters 0.490 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.469
Market Shares of Importers 0.512 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.484
Note: “Average ϕ” at Steady State is a productivity average using the plants’ combined revenues (or market shares) as
weights:
∫ ∑
d
ϕσ−1 r(η,d)P (d|η)∫ ∑
d′ r(η
′,d′)P (d′|η′)dg∗η(η′)
dg∗η(η).
33
State” between trade and autarky. Moving from trade to autarky leads to a 3.0% decrease in this
measure of aggregate productivity at the steady state. We also see a fall in productivity under
partial trade barriers. In the fourth and eleventh rows of Table 11, we also report the effect
of trade on a measure of aggregate productivity which includes the positive productivity effect
from importing intermediates. Finally, by comparing between the experiments with and without
equilibrium price responses, we clearly see the importance of the equilibrium price response to
quantitatively explain the impact of trade on aggregate productivity.
The counterfactual experiments under no trade in final goods or no trade in intermediates
(but not both) highlight the interaction between exporting and importing in the presence of
heterogeneous firms. According to the estimated basic model, when the economy moves from
full trade to no trade in intermediates, the fraction of exporters declines from a 17.7% to 2.4%.
Similarly, when the economy moves from full trade to no trade in final goods, the fraction of
importers declines from a 21.6% to 5.1%. In terms of market shares, moving from trade to no
intermediate trade leads to a decrease in the total market shares of exporters from 46.2% to
14.6% while moving from trade to no trade in final goods leads to a decrease in the total market
shares of importers from 51.8% to 22.4%. Thus, policies that prohibit the import of foreign
materials could have a large negative impact on the export of final consumption goods, and
vice-versa.
To examine the role of complementarities between export and import fixed costs relative to
the role played by the complementarities in the revenue function, we conducted an experiment
to determine what would happen to the fraction of importers and/or the fraction of exporters
had there been no complementarity between export and import in the fixed cost function.
Eliminating the fixed cost complementarity also lowers the fraction of exporters and importers,
as expected, but the impact is less than under trade restrictions. These results suggest that
both forms of complementarities are present.
We now examine the results from the extended model, reported in Table 12, and compare
them with the results from the basic model. The estimated welfare effect of exposure to trade in
the extended model is larger than in the basic model; the experiment implies that, if σ = 5, then
moving from autarky to trade increases real income by (9.0/4=)2.25% in the extended model as
opposed to 1.52% in the basic model. Unobserved heterogeneity in transportation costs provides
an additional source of gains from trade; plants with low transportation costs self-select into
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export and import activities and, as a result, resource are reallocated toward exporters and
importers who have advantages in exporting and importing.
The equilibrium impact of trade on aggregate productivity reported in “ln(Average ϕ)” is
almost zero in the extended model. Note that the impact of trade on aggregate productivity
without an equilibrium price effect is a 2.8% but the equilibrium price response has a negative
impact on aggregate productivity, offsetting the “partial equilibrium” effect of trade on aggregate
productivity in the extended model.28 This result qualitatively contrasts with the result from
the basic model.
Once we take into account the additional productivity effect from importing, however, the
equilibrium impact of trade on aggregate productivity is 8.2% in the extended model while it is
7.6% in the basic model, as reported in the fourth row of Tables 11-12. In the extended model,
heterogeneity in productivity gains from importing plays a major role in redistributing resources
and determining aggregate productivity. Moving from autarky to trade causes plants who have
higher productivity gains from importing to self-select into importing; as a result, resources are
reallocated toward importing plants who achieved higher productivity gains from importing,
leading to an increase in aggregate productivity.
Moving from free trade to no trade in intermediate goods, the fraction of exporters declines
from 17.3% to 12.4 % while the market shares of exporters decline from 49.0% to 42.1%. Thus,
shutting down intermediate goods trade has a negative impact on exporting in the extended
model but its magnitude is much smaller than in the basic model. Similarly, when the economy
moves from free trade to no trade in final goods, the fraction of importers as well as the market
shares of importers decline in the extended model but by a smaller magnitude than in the basic
model.
In the extended model, eliminating the complementarity in the fixed cost function lowers
the fraction of exporters or importers but not as much as in the case of no trade in intermediate
goods or no trade in final goods. Thus, as in the basic model, both the complementarities in
the revenue function and the complementarities in the fixed cost function are important for
capturing the interaction between exporting and importing.
28When the aggregate price decreases (or the real wage increases) as a result of moving from autarky to trade,
resource are reallocated not only toward highly productive plants but also toward plants with low transportation
costs. Since plants with low transportation costs are not necessarily the ones with high productivity, it is not clear
ex-ante whether the impact of a decrease in the aggregate price on aggregate productivity is positive or negative.
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To briefly summarize the results of the counterfactual experiments, we find that trade barriers
have a substantial negative effect on aggregate welfare and aggregate productivity. Furthermore,
the experiments suggest that there are significant revenue and cost complementarities between
the exportation of final goods and the importation of intermediate goods. Thus, policies which
restrict imports of intermediates harm exporters of final goods and restricting exports of those
goods decreases the ability of firms to use productivity-enhancing imported intermediates.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
We have developed and estimated a stochastic industry model of importing and exporting with
heterogeneous firms. The analysis highlights interactions between imports of intermediate goods
and exports of final goods. In doing so, we have identified a potential mechanism whereby import
policy can affect exports and export policy can affect imports.
Our model has a simple parsimonious structure and, yet, is able to replicate the basic features
of the plant-level data. To maintain its parsimony, and also because of data limitations and
computational complexity, the model ignores several important features. In estimation, we
treat manufacturing as a single industry although there are possibly differences across more
narrowly defined industries in some of the parameter values. Because we mainly focus on the
cross-sectional steady state implications, we do not distinguish between per-period fixed costs
and the one time sunk costs despite empirical evidence of sunk costs for exporting and importing
(e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2005). We also do not address the
important issue of how multi-plant and multinational firms make joint decisions on exporting
and importing across different plants. Finally, we ignore plant capital investment decisions.
These features could be incorporated into our theoretical and empirical framework and such
extensions are important topics for our future research.
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A.1 Estimation of the Density Function
Conditioning on ϕi, we may compute the estimate of ωit = (ω1,it, ω2,it, ω3,it)′ from (24)-(26) as
ω˜1,it(ϕi) = ln rit − α0 − αt − ln[1 + exp(zx)]dxit − αm ln[1 + exp(zm)]dmit − lnϕi,
ω˜2,it(ϕi) = lnNr
f
it/rit − ln[exp(zx)/(1 + exp(zx))],
ω˜3,it(ϕi) = lnXmit /Xit − αm ln[exp(zm)/(1 + exp(zm)].
Since whether we may observe ω˜2,it and ω˜3,it or not depends on the export/import choices,
we use the following conditional density function to compute the likelihood contribution from
revenues and export/import intensities:
gω(ω˜it|dit) =

gω1(ω˜1,it) for dit = (0, 0),
gω1(ω˜1,it)gω2|ω1(ω˜2,it|ω1,it) for dit = (1, 0),
gω1(ω˜1,it)gω3|ω1(ω˜3,it|ω1,it) for dit = (0, 1),
gω(ω˜it) for dit = (1, 1),
where gω1(·) is a marginal distribution of ω1,it while gωj |ω1(·|ω1,it) is a conditional distribution
of ωj,it given ω1,it for j = 2, 3. Specifically, given the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition
of Σω, we may write (ω1,it, ω2,it, ω3,it)′ ≡ (λ11ζ1,it, λ21ζ1,it+λ22ζ2,it, λ31ζ1,it+λ32ζ2,it+λ33ζ3,it)′,
where λm,n is the (m,n)-th element of Λω, and ζj,it is independently distributed N(0, 1) for all
j, i, t. Then, gωj |ω1(ω˜j,it|ω˜1,it) = 1√2piλjj exp
(
−12
(
ω˜j,it−(λj1/λ11)ω˜1,it
λjj
)2)
for j = 2, 3.
A.2 Counterfactual Experiments
Denote the equilibrium aggregate price under the parameter θ by P (θ). Suppose that we are
interested in a counterfactual experiment characterized by a counterfactual parameter vector
θ˜ that is different from the estimated parameter vector θˆ. Recall that we have the following
relationship between α0 and the equilibrium price P :
αˆ0 = ln
[
(Γ(σ − 1)/σ)σ−1R
]
+ (σ − 1) lnP (θˆ),
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where the aggregate price is explicitly written as a function of θ. At the counterfactual aggregate
price P (θ˜), the coefficient α0 takes a value of
α˜0 = ln
[
(Γ(σ − 1)/σ)σ−1R
]
+ (σ − 1) lnP (θ˜) = αˆ0 + k(θ˜, θˆ),
where
k(θ˜, θˆ) ≡ (σ − 1) ln
(
P (θ˜)/P (θˆ)
)
represents the equilibrium price change (up to the parameter (σ − 1)).
Thus, replacing αˆ0 with α˜0, we may evaluate the revenue function (28) at the counterfactual
aggregate price P (θ˜) (i.e. at the counterfactual value of α0):
r(ϕi, dit; k(θ˜, θˆ)) = exp
(
k(θ˜, θˆ) + αˆ0 + ln[1 + exp(zx)]dxit + αˆm ln[1 + exp(zm)]d
m
it + lnϕi
)
. (30)
The equilibrium price change, k(θ˜, θˆ), is then determined so that the following equilibrium free
entry condition holds:
fˆe =
∫
V
(
ϕ′; θ˜, k(θ˜, θˆ)
)
g(ϕ′; θ˜)dϕ′.
Here V
(
ϕ′; θ˜, k(θ˜, θˆ)
)
is the solution to the Bellman equations (16)-(18) when the revenue func-
tion (30) is used to compute profits and g(ϕ′; θ˜) is the normal probability density function from
which the initial productivity is drawn.29
29For every pair (θ˜, θˆ), there exists a unique value of k(θ˜, θˆ) that satisfies the free entry condition because the
value function V (ϕ′; θ˜, k(θ˜, θˆ)) is strictly increasing in k(θ˜, θˆ).
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